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Rocking the Suburbs: Incentive Zoning as a Tool to
Eliminate Sprawl
I. INTRODUCTION
For many people driving down the interstate, viewing the peripheral
landscape is not the first concern, especially when faced with rush hour
traffic. What would these people see if they did have the time to look to
their left and right while driving? This question may seem silly to many
as foliage and greenery may be the only landscape available to view on
both sides of the interstate—especially if in a climate conducive to
“greener pastures.” However, if one could view a panoramic of the
landscape what one would likely see may be similar to the following: on
the very near left is a burgeoning city with its own structure and aesthetic
features. Further to the left is a small village, town, hamlet, or some other
small growth. The same can be viewed to the right, only this time it
appears that the tiny village is now much larger, almost eating into the
larger city it appeared to be breaking away from. A few miles down the
road is another small grouping of homes without any hint of shopping
centers, gas stations, or any other commercial development. Still further
on is a dusty dirt road leading out to more tiny hamlets as if each
grouping was its own feudal kingdom.
This sporadic growth technique has often been coined “sprawl” and,
though not limited to such situations, has increasingly come under fire in
a time when more individuals are concerned about the environment, air
and environmental pollution, and the decreasing view of the American
farming landscape. Sprawl has been defined as “low-density
development on the edges of cities and towns that is poorly planned,
land-consumptive, automobile-dependent [and] designed without regard
to its surroundings.”1 Without pointing the finger of blame at the
landowners who either sell their property to developers or develop the
property themselves, it is important to consider first that growth is
inevitable as population increases and that it provides many necessary
and important benefits for the economy.
To some minor extent, the growth and popularity of suburban
lifestyle has perpetuated and fed the growing craze of sprawl. Movies
1. Robert H. Freilich, Smart Growth in Western Metro Areas, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 687,
687 (2003) (quoting Richard Moe, Alternatives to Sprawl, LINCOLN INST. OF PUB. POL’Y 4 (1995)).
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such as “The Burbs” and television series including “Desperate
Housewives” portray the suburban community as mainstream and
desirable. The problem is that home prices in many regions are too
expensive for families, especially younger families, requiring the further
growth and development on the suburban fringe to provide affordable
housing. The appreciation of home prices in many parts of the country
coupled with the relaxed lending standards for homebuyers created a
self-perpetuated development epidemic which fed on new suburban
developments. This has only fueled the discussion on urban sprawl.
Robert Freilich, a leading scholar on land use issues, describes seven
major crises arising from urban sprawl: “[1] central city and first- and
second-ring suburban decline, [2] environmental degradation through
loss of wetlands and sensitive lands and air and water quality
degradation, [3] energy over-utilization, [4] fiscal insolvency and
infrastructure and service deficiencies, [5] agricultural land loss, [6]
housing inaffordability, and [7] diminished public health.”2 Other
criticisms of sprawl are that “it requires significant development of new
capital facilities and services, with accompanying underutilization of
existing built-up area facilities.”3 Yet as home prices continue to climb
individuals continue to push the fringes of suburban development further
out.
In an effort to curb sprawl, a number of states have enacted statutes
geared toward smart growth.4 Such statutes, in addition to providing
other benefits, “[reduce] the consumption of land for roads, houses, and
commercial buildings by channeling development to areas with existing
infrastructure or contiguous to existing growth.”5 When effectively used,
“[smart growth] centers growth on urban, older suburban areas,
transportation corridor centers, and New Urbanist Villages, thus

2. Id. at 687–88.
3. Id. at 687.
4. See, e.g., California, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65915 (West 2007); Colorado, COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 24-32-3201 (West 2006); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-103 (West
2007); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7508 (2006); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 420.615 (West
2006); Illinois, 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-13-1 (West 2005); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 198A.720 (West 2006); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5283 (2006); Maryland, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 12.01 (2006); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40R, § 13 (West
2004); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.255 (West 2006); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
278.250 (West 2006) (amended 2007); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:21 (2006);
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-65 (West 2004); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.296
(West 2005); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-128-8.1 (2006); Texas, TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 373A.054 (Vernon 2006); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-38f-1704 (West 2006); Virginia,
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2201 (West 2006); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.540
(West 2007); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8A-3-1 (West 2007).
5. Freilich, supra note 1, at 691.
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preserving green space, wetlands, and farmland.”6
Efforts to curb the checkerboard of development on the fringes of
suburban communities have led a number of cities and states7 around the
country to adopt priority growth districts, also called priority growth
areas, which “direct development to selected locations and also specify a
design that is attractive to the community’s current and future
residents.”8 Priority growth areas are generally areas within a community
that the city or municipality has specifically set up as priority areas for
future growth because of the area’s existing infrastructure, including the
area’s location near transit corridors. However, the economic viability of
projects for developers is still a concern for cities and municipalities in
effectively directing development to selected locations. In ensuring that
such growth districts attract developers, a number of mechanisms
including incentive zoning are employed.
The focus of this paper is on incentive zoning in priority growth
districts. Specifically, the paper focuses on incentive zoning through the
lens of New Urban communities and how these communities can best
accommodate incentive zoning through clustered development and
density bonuses. Part II addresses the smart growth initiatives, their case
law underpinnings, and how priority growth districts fit into the smart
growth plan. Part III examines incentive zoning as a method of fueling
New Urban communities that further smart growth initiatives. Part IV
looks at the Daybreak development and the surrounding developments in
both South Jordan and West Jordan, Utah, and the Glenwood Park and
Vickery developments in greater Atlanta, Georgia. In particular, this
section will examine any statutory incentives created to drive
development of these communities with any potential negative
ramifications flowing from an absence of statutory incentives. Part V
provides a summary and discussion of smart growth initiatives and
focuses on the effectiveness of incentive zoning in New Urban
communities. Finally, Part VI provides a brief conclusion.

6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 226-114 (2006); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
30-A, § 4349-A (2006); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-506.10 (West 2006); Oregon,
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.298 (2005); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2793c (2005); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.020 (West 2007).
8. JEREMY STONE ET AL., Breaking Ground: Planning and Building in Priority Growth
Districts, YALE SCH. OF FORESTRY & ENVTL. STUD. 3 (2005).
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II. SMART GROWTH INITIATIVES AND PRIORITY GROWTH DISTRICTS
A. Smart Growth Initiatives9
The concern over “adverse impacts of sprawling land use
development” is not new.10 “Daniel Patrick Moynihan warned over forty
years ago that, ‘[i]t is becoming increasingly apparent that American
government, both national and local, can no longer ignore what is
happening as the suburbs eat endlessly into the countryside.’”11
Additionally, a recent report by the real estate industry stated that
“America is dominated by a culture of single-family homes, lawns, and
endless shopping strips, punctuated by turning lanes, gasoline stations,
and blacktop parking lots.”12 While these things are not inherently bad,
they lead to a large separation in the population and a decrease in social
interaction, smog and congestion from increased reliance on the
automobile, and a quickened timeframe for creating blighted
communities. As the population pushes further out, it leaves in its wake
urban and first- and second-ring suburban decline.
It should be noted that growth in itself is not bad. In fact, growth
helps by “bring[ing] jobs, wealth, tax revenues, and amenities.”13 What
should be understood is that “certain patterns of scattered, haphazard
9. The author realizes that the term “smart growth” has come under criticism by cynics who
describe the movement as a “lumping” of everything growth oriented into a term called smart
growth. See, e.g., Timothy Beatley & Richard Collins, Smart Growth and Beyond: Transitioning to a
Sustainable Society, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 287, 291 (2000) (“The smart growth tag neatly creates a
rhetorical advantage by contrasting it with what can only be considered ‘dumb’ growth. The use of
the word smart is simply smart.”); John W. Frece, Symposium 2005: Twenty Lessons From
Maryland’s Smart Growth Initiative, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 106, 114 (2005) (“Even before the initiative
was enacted, it became obvious that those who opposed ‘Smart Growth’ must inevitably favor
‘dumb growth.’ No one wanted to be seen as favoring ‘dumb growth.’”); James A. Kushner, Smart
Growth, New Urbanism and Diversity: Progressive Planning Movements in America and Their
Impact on Poor and Minority Ethnic Populations, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 53 (2003)
(“Smart Growth is a vague doctrine that attempts to target infrastructure capital improvement
subsidies, such as roads, utilities, and schools toward land planned for urbanization and away from
areas currently not identified or planned for urbanization.”); Robert J. McMurry, Update: Smart
Growth—Is it Working?, SF08 ALI-ABA 597, 601 (2000) (“But ‘Smart’ Growth is good marketing;
everything else, by definition, must be Dumb Growth.”); Chris J. Williams, Do Smart Growth
Policies Invite Regulatory Takings Challenges? A Survey of Smart Growth and Regulatory Takings
in the Southeastern United States, 55 ALA. L. REV. 895, 896 (2004) (“Like sprawl, the term ‘smart
growth’ is given a variety of meanings by different individuals and groups based on their
perspectives.”).
10. Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls of
Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 250 (2000).
11. Id. (quoting Daniel Patrick Moynihan, New Roads and Urban Chaos, THE REPORTER,
Apr. 14, 1960, at 20).
12. Id. (quoting PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & LEND LEASE REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS,
EMERGING TRENDS IN REAL ESTATE 22 (1999)).
13. Id. at 248.
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development . . . cause adverse impacts,” and are harmful.14 Thus, the
purpose of smart growth is to
balance economic development and limit sprawl by channeling growth
to areas that have already been developed; to revitalize and prevent the
decline of existing urban and suburban areas; to promote more compact
urban form; to protect open space, farmland, forests, and
environmentally sensitive areas from suburban encroachment; to reduce
the public cost of providing infrastructure and services to new
development by making more efficient use of existing resources; to
protect the natural environment; and to provide affordable housing.15

A number of techniques have been employed to curb sprawl and provide
smart growth. These include interim development controls and
moratoriums on future growth,16 timing controls requiring adequate
public facilities before future development,17 and urban growth
boundaries. Much of the smart growth revolution stems from the seminal
decision of Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo.18 The decision in
Ramapo created the smart growth era after the court determined that
“where it is clear that the existing physical and financial resources of the
community are inadequate to furnish the essential services and facilities
which a substantial increase in population requires, there is a rational
basis for ‘phased growth,’” and furthermore, “the challenged ordinance
is not violative of the Federal and State Constitutions.”19
As one of the most significant land use cases ever,20 the decision in
Ramapo has led states to implement controlled and timed growth
measures similar to the measures adopted in Ramapo in an effort to keep
the pace of growth commensurate with the town’s ability to provide
facilities and services to accommodate the growth.21 Many innovations in
this growth have been proposed under the umbrella of smart growth, and
one such form has been the implementation of priority growth districts,
which help by funneling development into areas in suburban and exurban communities where there is existing infrastructure and means to
14. Id. at 253.
15. Id. at 255–56.
16. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
17. See Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 304–05.
20. Dozier & Hagman, Comment, Ranking Land Development and Environmental Cases and
Courts, 4 ENVTL. COMMENT 4 (1978).
21. See statutes cited supra note 4.
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accommodate the increase in population.
B. Priority Growth Districts
Jeremy Stone, editor at the Land Use Law Center at the Pace
University Law School recently published a book with the Yale School
of Forestry & Environmental Studies which discusses the importance of
priority growth districts in the age of smart growth.22 Priority growth
districts are a recent outgrowth of smart growth innovation, and have
been created as a way to retard urban sprawl and preserve the
environment. Priority growth districts are defined as
specially selected areas where, through the comprehensive planning
process, a community has determined that growth is desirable,
compatible with existing uses, and can be implemented in a manner
that will enhance the larger community by providing needed housing
alternatives, preserving open space, and adding retail, commercial and
community uses that support the tax base.23

The introduction of priority growth districts has arisen as “an
innovative land use technique that can be used by communities to
manage and define future growth in a way that creates more livable
places.”24 As proposed, the priority growth district concept is
“particularly suited for outlying suburban and ex-urban counties, where
the rate of growth is significant but there is still a rural character that can
be preserved.”25
The goal of a priority growth district is to identify “where roadways
and other infrastructure either exist or can be accommodated.”26 The
purpose of this is to ensure that rather than developing hodge-podge,
checkerboard neighborhoods throughout cities, towns, and hamlets, there
is current and existing transit corridors and infrastructure available to
accommodate growth, thereby keeping growth harmonious with the
overall community plans.
The benefits from adopting smart growth techniques, including
priority growth districts, are summarized as follows: First,
“[d]evelopment is implemented as planned neighborhoods or centers that
have previously been designated and selected with meaningful
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 11.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
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community input,” replacing “an adversarial and reactionary land use
process with a proactive and constructive one.”27 Second, priority growth
districts reduce “the overall demand for new sprawl development” by
“respond[ing] to the housing demands of current and future residents.”28
One way this is accomplished is by allowing the aging population to
relocate within the district to more appropriate housing, including
condominium and apartment housing, while leaving the larger homes to
the “young newly formed households.”29 Third, “[priority growth
districts] protect natural resources by designating areas to be preserved
within the districts as well as relieving development pressures on
outlying open space areas in other portions of the community.”30 Fourth,
congestion problems can be reduced. “Mixed uses can reduce traffic
generation beyond the district by ‘capturing’ trips between uses within
the district.”31 Fifth, and as an ancillary benefit to the previous benefit, is
the potential health benefits by increased use of alternative transportation
modes, “such as walking, bicycling, jitneys, and the like.”32 Sixth,
“[priority growth districts] facilitate efficient and predictable capital
planning for infrastructure such as roads, utilities, transit facilities, and
schools.”33 This efficiency is created by replacing the customary “caseby-case, problem-solving approach of constructing highway intersection
improvements and other capital improvements to mitigate individual
project impacts.”34 Seventh, priority growth districts “reduce
infrastructure costs.”35 These reduced costs occur from “shorter,
narrower roads and shorter utility distribution systems.”36 More
important to Jeremy Stone was that
[priority growth districts] support centralized facilities that allow
economies of scale and more efficient and effective technology, such as
central water and sewage treatment plants and community storm water
management and water quality facilities, rather than relying upon
individual septic and storm water systems that may not be properly or
regularly maintained. The more effective central systems have positive

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 15.
Id.
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environmental and economic benefits.37

Eighth, “[priority growth districts] bring a mix of land uses that enhance
and diversify the local tax base, generating additional revenues to meet
the costs of municipal and educational services.”38
Jeremy Stone suggests that “[b]y combining [priority growth
districts] with incentive zoning . . . allowable densities can be reduced in
other parts of the community and open space preserved.”39 This
technique of combining priority growth districts with incentive zoning is
a goal in many communities including West Jordan, Utah.
C. Communities Implementing Priority Growth Districts
The popularity of priority growth districts has become evident in
many communities across the country. In Breaking Ground: Planning
and Building in Priority Growth Districts, a number of communities are
mentioned that have adopted or are in the process of implementing
priority growth districts.40 States adopting and implementing priority
growth districts include: New York,41 Maryland,42 South Carolina,43
Florida,44 Alabama,45 California,46 Colorado,47 Georgia,48 Louisiana,49
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 17–19, 85–101; Four Corners, East Fishkill, New
York, http://www.eastfishkillny.org/pdf/plan/ plan14.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Town Center,
LaGrange, New York, http://www.lagrangetowncenter.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2008); Warwick
Grove, Warwick, New York, http://www.warwick-grove.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
42. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 125; Lakelands, Gaithersburg, Maryland,
http://www.lakelands.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
43. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 63, 130–31; Habersham, Beaufort, South Carolina,
http://www.habershamsc.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Harborside, Richland County, South
Carolina, http://www.lakecarolina.com/about/towncenter.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2007);
Maybank Green, I’on, South Carolina, http://www.ioncommunity.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
44. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 121–24; Amelia Park, Fernandina Beach, Florida,
http://www.lendryhomes.com/communities/ap/main_frame.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007);
Avonlea, Stuart, Florida, http://www.avonleahome.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Botanica-Sea
Plum, Jupiter, Florida, http://www.newurbancommunities.com/communities/profile.asp?CID=879&
page=profile&status=fl_active (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Longleaf, New Port Richey, Florida,
http://www.longleaftown.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Seaside, Walton County, Florida,
http://www.alysbeach.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Winthrop, Brandon, Florida,
http://www.dpz.com/project.aspx?Project_Number=9929&type=3 (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
45. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 119–20; Mt. Laurel, Birmingham, Alabama,
http://www.mtlaurel.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); The Preserve, Hoover, Alabama,
http://www.birminghamhomereview.com/The-Preserve/ (last visited Feb. 15, 200); Providence,
Huntsville, Alabama, http://www.villageofprovidence.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
46. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 120–21; Doe Mill Neighborhood, Chico, California,
http://www.doemill.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
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Massachusetts,50 Michigan,51 New Jersey,52 New Mexico,53 North
Carolina,54 Oregon,55 Tennessee,56 Texas,57 Virginia,58 and Washington.59
Not listed in this group, but likely meeting the qualifications and
specifications of a priority growth district, would be Utah, with the
Daybreak60 development in South Jordan.
A by-product of priority growth districts is the growing popularity of
New Urban communities, which follow a pattern of clustering of high
density development interspersed with commercial and residential
buildings. Included in the discussion of priority growth districts is the use
of incentive zoning to accomplish the goals and objectives of these
districts.

47. For example, Belle Creek, Commerce City, Colorado and Prospect, Longmont, Colorado.
See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 121.
48. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 124; Glenwood Park, Atlanta, Georgia,
http://www.glenwoodpark.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Vickery, Forsythe County, Georgia,
http://www.hedgewoodhomes.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
49. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 125; River Ranch, Lafayette, Louisiana,
http://riverranch.info/riverranch/index.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
50. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 125; Mashpee Commons, Mashpee, Massachusetts,
http://www.mashpeecommons.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
51. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 125; Town Commons, Howell, Michigan,
http://www.towncommonsllc.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
52. For example, Old York Village, North Burlington, New Jersey. See STONE ET AL., supra
note 8, at 126.
53. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 127; Aldea de Santa Fe, Santa Fe, New Mexico,
http://www.aldeadesantafe.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
54. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 127; Afton Village, Concord, North Carolina,
http://www.aftonvillage.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Cheshire, Black Mountain, North Carolina,
http://www.villageofcheshire.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Devaun Park, Calabash, North
Carolina, http://www.devaunpark.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Southern Village, Chapel Hill,
North Carolina, http://www.southernvillage.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Woodsong, Shallotte,
North Carolina, http://www.villageofwoodsong.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
55. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 127; Fairview Village, Fairview, Oregon,
http://www.fairviewvillage.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
56. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 127; Lenox Village, Nashville, Tennessee,
http://www.lenoxvillage.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007); Pleasant View Village, Pleasant View,
Tennessee, http://www.pleasantviewvillage.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
57. See Home Town, North Richland Hills, Texas, http://www.hometownnrh.com (last
visited Oct. 29, 2007); Plum Creek, Kyle, Texas, http://www.plumcreektx.com (last visited Oct. 29,
2007); Village of Colleyville, Colleyville, Texas; STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 132–33.
58. For example, Belmont Greene, Loudoun County, Virginia, and Belmont Bay, Prince
William County, Virginia. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 133; Belmont Bay, Prince William
County, Virginia, http://www.belmont-bay.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
59. For example, Lookout Ridge, Washougal, Washington. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8,
at 134.
60. See Daybreak, South Jordan, Utah, http://www.daybreakutah.com/ (last visited Oct. 29,
2007).
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III. INCENTIVE ZONING AS A MEANS OF FURTHERING NEW URBANISM
A. Background
“Incentive Zoning is a development in land use regulation that
encourages the creation of certain amenities and land use designs that a
community wishes to promote.”61 Under an incentive zoning method,
developers provide the amenities and designs desired by the city in
exchange for development incentives. Incentive zoning has arisen as a
formula of encouragement for developers to participate in certain
projects. Under incentive zoning, the “more intens[ive] use of property
will generate greater profits for the developer, which is the quid pro quo
for providing the amenity or design sought by the community.”62 The
standard benefit granted to developers is a density bonus on the
property.63 In other words, “[t]hrough incentive zoning, a municipality
may receive certain amenities or design restrictions related to a particular
development project in exchange for granting [the density bonus].”64 The
New York Court of Appeals described the purpose of incentive zoning as
“based on the premise that certain uneconomic uses and amenities will
not be provided by private development without economic incentive. The
economic incentive frequently used . . . is the allowance of greater
density within a proposed building, more floor area than permitted under
general rules.”65
B. New York Statutory Acceptance of Incentive Zoning
The first state to codify the application of incentive zoning was New
York. New York adopted incentive zoning among towns and villages in
1991.66 The bill adopting incentive zoning was codified as section 261-b
of the Town Law and section 7-703 of the Village Law.67 The section
states that the purpose of incentive zoning “shall be to advance the
town’s specific physical, cultural and social policies in accordance with
the town’s comprehensive plan and in coordination with other

61. Michael Murphy & Joseph Stinson, Incentive Zoning (1996) in Pace University School
of Law Land Use Law Center, L.U.C.A.S., http://www.law.pace.edu/landuse/incent.html (last visited
Apr. 24, 2007).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Terry Rice, Zoning and Land Use, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 615, 622–23 (1992) (quoting
Asian Am. for Equal. v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d, 265, 269 (N.Y. 1988)).
66. Id. at 622.
67. Id. at 623.
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community planning mechanisms or land use techniques.”68 The statute
also defines “incentives or bonuses” as “adjustments to the permissible
population density, area, height, open space, use, or other provisions of a
zoning ordinance or local law for a specific purpose authorized by the
town board.”69 Community benefits are defined as “open space, housing
for persons of low or moderate income, parks, elder care, day care or
other specific physical, social or cultural amenities, or cash in lieu
thereof, of benefit to the residents of the community authorized by the
town board.”70 “Each district in which incentives or bonuses may be
awarded must be designated by the local legislative body in its zoning
ordinance or local law and must be depicted on the municipality’s
official zoning map.”71 As part of the smart growth model and
incorporated in incentive zoning, “[p]rior to designating any district to
receive incentives or bonuses, it must be found that the district contains
adequate resources, environmental quality, and public facilities,
including adequate transportation, water supply, waste disposal, and fire
protection.”72 The same principles guiding the effective use of incentive
zoning also apply to New Urban communities and priority growth
districts.
The New York Town Law also requires the consideration of
environmental impacts from the incentive zoning. The statute states that
“the town board shall, in designating such districts, determine that there
will be no significant environmentally damaging consequences and that
such incentives or bonuses are compatible with the development
otherwise permitted.”73 In other words, incentive zoning cannot be used
arbitrarily and must still conform to the public health, safety, and welfare
of the community. Additionally, where a major purpose of incentive
zoning is to allow for affordable housing for low-income individuals, the
statute requires that
[p]rior to the adoption or amendment of the zoning ordinance or local
law pursuant to this section to establish a system of zoning incentives
or bonuses the town board shall evaluate the impact of the provision of
such system of zoning incentives or bonuses upon the potential
development of affordable housing gained by the provision of any such
incentive or bonus afforded to an applicant or lost in the provision by

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261-b(2) (McKinney 2007).
Id. § 261-b(1)(a).
Id. § 261-b(1)(b).
Rice, supra note 65, at 624.
Id.
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261-b(3)(c) (McKinney 2007).
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an applicant of any community amenity to the town. Further, the town
board shall determine that there is approximate equivalence between
potential affordable housing lost or gained or that the town has or will
take reasonable action to compensate for any negative impact upon the
availability or potential development of affordable housing caused by
the provisions of this section.74

Finally, if the town board finds that there is no “suitable community
benefit or amenity” immediately feasible, “the board may require, in lieu
thereof, a payment to the town, of a sum of [cash] to be determined by
the board.”75 The provision providing for a cash payment in lieu of an
added amenity is provided to allow the city to offset the increased
density in an area when the developer is unable to produce an amenity
suitable to the community. Where the developer would normally “buy”
the increased density for the development through spending money on
amenities the community desires, the ability to pay a sum of cash in lieu
of an amenity provides the town with a way to recoup the costs for the
density bonus above the existing zoning limit where developers do not
“buy” their bonus with a specified amenity.
The result of the New York statute was that municipalities were
given the authority to create districts where incentive zoning was
permitted. The detriments of these districts, as mentioned in the statute,
cannot outweigh the benefits, especially when dealing with the issue of
creating a housing market that is affordable for low-income individuals.
Also, the use of incentive zoning has helped lead the smart growth
revolution, including the use of clustering and New Urbanism. Under
both approaches, the environmental impact of a development is
considered with the goal in mind to protect and preserve.
IV. NEW URBANISM CASE STUDIES: GLENWOOD PARK, VICKERY, AND
DAYBREAK
A. New Urbanism
The use of New Urbanism in accomplishing the goals of priority
growth districts has been increasingly popular. “Originating largely from
the design professions, New Urbanism focuses on building walkable,
mixed use neighborhoods with a strong sense of place as an alternative to
sprawling
low-density,
single-use,
automobile
dependent

74. Id. § 261-b(3)(g).
75. Id. § 261-b(3)(h).
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development.”76 One focus of New Urban communities is that “[w]ithin
neighborhoods, a broad range of housing types and price levels can bring
people of diverse ages, races, and incomes into daily interaction,
strengthening the personal and civic bonds essential to an authentic
community.”77
B. Daybreak, Utah
In 1994, Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation conceived of a project
in South Jordan, Utah that considered “where and how people will want
to live, how much open space [people desire], [the] types of recreational
options residents [want to] enjoy, and where retail, business, and
transportation hubs [would be] best located.”78 Initially named Sunrise,
the project was renamed Daybreak, and in 2001, Kennecott Land was
established to focus “exclusively on the opportunity to develop
Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation’s significant non-mineral land and
water rights.”79
Kennecott Land owns 93,000 acres of land along the “West Bench of
the Oquirrh Mountains and in Tooele Valley.”80 Among the 93,000 acres,
80,000 are situated in the Salt Lake Valley. These 80,000 acres constitute
approximately 53% of the undeveloped land remaining in the Salt Lake
Valley.81 The Daybreak community features approximately 4,200 acres
of land and is the first development project of Kennecott Land.82 “Since
the 4,200-acre community opened in June 2004, some 1,000 homes have
been sold and about 14,000 homes are planned over the next 10 to 15
years.”83 Not only does the community feature numerous homes, but
Daybreak will also feature “[a] major commercial center [that] will
provide jobs and shopping.”84 Additionally, “[t]he Mid-Jordan light-rail
line and Mountain View Corridor are planned through the Daybreak
community, [and] Oquirrh Lake, [a man-made lake on approximately
76. Brian W. Ohm & Robert J. Sitkowski, Integrating New Urbanism and Affordable
Housing Tools, 36 URB. LAW. 857, 857 (2004).
77. Id. (quoting Congress for the New Urbanism, Charter of the New Urbanism (1993), at 2,
available at http://www.cnu.org/cnu_reports/Charter.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2004)).
78. Kennecott Land News Release, Kennecott Land Announces Name and Time Line for
Development, Apr. 29, 2003, available at http://www.kennecottland.com/assets/releases/
Daybreakname.doc.
79. Id.
80. Kennecott Land, Questions & Answers at 1, http://www.kennecottland.com/assets/
q_a.pdf. (last visited Apr. 25, 2007).
81. Kennecott Land News Release, supra note 78, and accompanying text.
82. Kennecott Land, Questions & Answers, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
83. Id. at 2.
84. Id.
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eighty acres] will provide fishing, boating and bird-watching.”85 Even
more ambitious, the development anticipates over thirty-five miles of
trails,86 and has even discussed the possibility of snow-skiing on the
Oquirrh Mountain range.87
The Daybreak development is an example of a priority growth
district and has embraced the New Urban concept of development. The
Daybreak community itself has planned for 2.4 million square feet of
retail space, 5.2 million square feet of office space, and 1.5 million
square feet of flexible industrial space to be built over the next fifteen
years.88
However, South Jordan has yet to codify incentive zoning in the
city’s municipal code. Under the South Jordan Municipal Code,
[a]t any time after the approval of a [Planned Community] zone plan,
community structure plan, master subdivision plat, project
plan/preliminary subdivision plat or final project plan/subdivision, the
developer and the city may enter into a development agreement
reflecting all conditions of approval of the applicable plan and such
other matters as the city and the developer may agree.89

The effect of this provision is to grant the city and the developer the
opportunity to create a private development agreement with provisions
and conditions not set forth in the local municipal code. For South
Jordan, where incentive zoning is not codified, the ability to increase
density in the Daybreak development would hinge upon private
agreement with the city. Whether or not Daybreak was required to set
aside land for open space above the city requirement of 25% is a matter
between the individual parties. Additionally, any other amenity that
Daybreak provided through its development would be left to private
agreement between the city and developers.
Though South Jordan and the Daybreak development have yet to
incorporate incentive zoning90 through city statute, the Daybreak New
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Kennecott Land, Open Space, http://www.kennecottland.com/Mjk2.html (last visited
Apr. 25, 2007).
88. Kennecott Land, Economic Development, http://www.kennecottland.com/MzMw.html.
(last visited Apr. 25, 2007).
89. SOUTH JORDAN, UTAH, CODE § 17.72.230 (2003).
90. This is not to say that density bonuses were not granted to Daybreak, but simply that
incentive zoning is currently not permissible under South Jordan municipal code. It may very well be
that the fruits of incentive zoning were granted to Daybreak in the form of density bonuses, but for
other developers, density bonuses are conditioned solely on the ability to negotiate effectively with
cities through private development agreements.
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Urban community has affected surrounding cities. In May, 2006, West
Jordan City met to discuss the possible amendment to the city’s General
Plan Land Use Map to provide for approximately 6,600 acres of land,
known as the West Side Planning Area, which would be similar to
Daybreak in its development.91 The overall development of the 6,600
acres, representing much of the remaining undeveloped land in West
Jordan, would have the following look:
West Side Specific Planning Area Land Use Density Chart 92
Base Density
Maximum Density
Zone
D.U. Per Acre
D.U. Per Acre
VLSFR
1.00
2.00
LSFR
2.01
4.50
MFR
4.51
9.00
HFR
9.01
18.00
MU

NA

25.00

It was anticipated that approximately 3.5% of the land would be used
for Very Low Density development (VLSFR), defined as 1.0-2.0
dwelling units per acre.93 The Low Density development (LSFR) would
constitute nearly 50% of the land and would hold between 2.01-4.5
dwelling units per acre.94 The city would also provide approximately
30% of the land for Medium Density development (MFR) containing
4.51-9.0 dwelling units per acre.95 High Density development (HFR)
would constitute over 11% of the development and afford 9.01-18.0
dwelling units per acre.96 The Mixed-Use development (MU) was
granted over 5% of the total development and would allow for between
12.0-25.0 dwelling units per acre.97 This proposal was voted on and
passed six to one,98 with the stipulation that “[z]oning districts be
prepared reflecting incentive based concepts for bonus density for
amenities beginning with the low number of each residential category.”99
Additionally, when West Jordan City discussed the possibility of
91. Minutes of West Jordan City Counsel Meeting, May 23, 2006, at 8–16, available at
http://www.ci.west-jordan.ut.us/files/06May23.pdf.
92. WEST JORDAN, UTAH, ORDINANCE § 89-3-1106(a) (2006).
93. Minutes of West Jordan City Counsel Meeting, supra note 91, at 10.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 11.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id. at 15
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including either incentive zoning in the West Side development or
simply redrafting the Planned Community development code,100 the city
noted that “[i]ncentive zoning has received attention as communities
implement smart growth principles into [their] planning and development
processes,”101 and that “[t]he common types of community benefits or
amenities for which local governments have devised incentive programs
are urban design, human services including affordable housing, and
transit access.”102 West Jordan City initially103 came up with five
categories of importance in granting density bonuses under incentive
zoning. These categories include: Trails/Open space, Streetscape Design,
Smart Growth Subdivision Design, Building Design, and Transportation
Enhancement.104
Furthermore, West Jordan City created an incentive and density
bonus chart, which listed both required and optional bonuses under each
of the categories the city considered important in the implementation of
the incentive zoning bonuses.105 In calculating the bonus, the developer
would go through the following analysis: “[If] a developer wishes to
develop a parcel of land that has a land use designation of Low Density
Residential . . . [the developer can] decide that [he/she] want[s] to opt for
any additional amenities other than that which is now required under the
new implantation portion of the code.”106 The developer is not required
to add any other amenities from that which is required. However, “[if]
the developer desires to develop in the same land use category but
intends to introduce several amenities into the development, the
developer would view the “Density Calculator Chart,” aggregate the
percentage density bonus and then multiply this number by the beginning

100. Minutes of the City of West Jordan Mid-Year Strategic Planning Meeting, July 11, 2006,
at 10–12, available at http://www.ci.west-jordan.ut.us/files/06Jul11_Mid-Year1.pdf [hereinafter
Mid-Year Strategic Planning Meeting].
101. Id. at 10.
102. Id. at 10–11.
103. The five categories proposed in the Mid-Year Strategic Planning Meeting held July 11,
2006, were eventually condensed into four when the West Side Planning Area Ordinance was
passed. See WEST JORDAN, UTAH, ORDINANCE § 89-3-1106(c). The category of “Transportation
Enhancement” was eliminated.
104. Mid-Year Strategic Planning Meeting, supra note 100 at 11.
105. Id.
106. Memorandum Regarding Implementation Zoning-Density Bonus Incentives from
Gregory Mikolash, Senior Planner, to West Jordan City Council (July 17, 2006) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Memorandum to West Jordan City Council].
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density to determine the new density after the incentive bonus.107 The
city noted that
[t]he only way in which a developer will be able to reach “Maximum
Density” in each land use category would be for 100% of the listed
amenities to be installed in the development. It is not possible for a
developer to increase density in any given land use category beyond the
“Maximum Density,” nor is it possible to give 110% and jump to a
different land use category . . . [thus] a development in a low density
residential land use category could not exceed 4.5 dwelling units per
acre.108

Thus, in the case of West Jordan, and the West Side Specific Area Plan,
the city’s initial evaluation on what amenities or programs it considers
important has great weight in determining how much of a density bonus
is allotted for the developer. The initial evaluation for determining the
respective “weight” given each amenity can take a number of approaches
including [1] the actual cost of providing the stated amenity, or [2] the
relative importance of having such an amenity in the development. For
West Jordan, what appears to be the most important amenity based on
the Density Incentive Chart is “Trails & Open Space” as this particular
feature grants up to a 22% density bonus to the developer.109 Although it
appears that much of the density bonus hinges on the cost of the specific
attribute or feature the developer wants to incorporate, the Density
Incentive Chart as proposed fails to include any incentive or bonus for
providing a certain percentage of affordable housing, a potential area of
concern for a growing community with a limited amount of remaining
developable area.
C. Glenwood Park, Atlanta, Georgia
Another example of a New Urban development located in a priority
growth district is Glenwood Park of Atlanta, Georgia. In 2003, the
Glenwood Park development was the recipient of a “Congress for New
Urbanism Charter Award in the neighborhood, district, and corridor
107. Id. See hypothetical where the chosen amenities equal 60% on the “Density Calculator
Chart.” This number is then multiplied by the particular “Beginning Density,” see table supra at 92,
e.g., 2.01 for LSFR, to come up with the new density, in this case 3.216 (1.60 x 2.01 =3.216)
dwelling units per acre. For another approach in calculating density bonuses see SUFFOLK, VA.,
UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE § 31-409 (2001), available at http://www.suffolk.va.us/
citygovt/udo/index.html.
108. Memorandum to West Jordan City Council, supra note 106.
109. WEST JORDAN, UTAH, ORDINANCE § 89-3-1106(c) (2006).
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category.”110 In 2006, Glenwood Park was the recipient of the Urban
Land Institute’s development of the year for Atlanta. The Glenwood Park
development is a “28 acre, 425-unit community” located outside of
downtown Atlanta, Georgia.111 The development includes “single-family
houses, condominiums, lofts, apartments, and live/work units.”112 Among
its many features, the community sits “adjacent to a proposed transit line
and has two civic squares.”113Additionally, the community features over
20,000 square feet of office space while also providing over 80,000
square feet of retail space.114 Like other New Urban developments,
Glenwood Park features narrower streets, wider tree-lined sidewalks,
clustering in residential areas, and open parks and areas for residents to
go for recreation.115
Access to transit corridors and alleviating traffic and congestion is of
particular importance in New Urban communities. Glenwood Park is
located directly off Interstate 20 outside of downtown Atlanta and has
access to mass transit as well as major interstate arteries. The 28-acre
project required a $25 million land investment, and an additional $140
million building and construction investment.116 However, like
Daybreak, Glenwood Park has yet to specifically adopt incentive zoning
in the municipal code.
D. Vickery, Cumming, Georgia
The Vickery development consists of 214 acres in Forsyth County,
Georgia.117 Like other New Urban communities, Vickery is located next
to a transit corridor, thereby allowing residents greater access to transit
opportunities. “The master plan calls for approximately 70 units
consisting of 431 single-family detached homes, 125 town homes, and
additional lofts and live/work units located in the town center.”118
Additionally, the development includes over 100,000 square feet of retail
space and over 50,000 square feet of office space.119 The commercial

110. STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 124.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Janet Jones Kendall, Glenwood has Perfect Recipe for Urban Success, ATLANTA BUS.
CHRON., Sept. 25, 2006, available at http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2006/09/25/
focus3.html?t=printable.
117. STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 124.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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space is mixed use with much of the office space above the retail
space.120 Beyond the commercial space, the community dedicates “55
acres [to] parks and open green ways.”121
Forsyth County, like South Jordan, Utah, and Atlanta, has yet to
adopt incentive zoning by statute. The express provision dealing with the
Vickery development states that
[t]he maximum number of dwelling units per acre in residential areas of
the planned unit development should not exceed 1.2 times the gross
density recommended by the future land use map of the comprehensive
plan for the unit of land unless such density is found [by] the board of
commissioners to be justified to achieve the goals of the land use
plan.122

Thus, absent a private agreement between developers and commissioners
“justifying” the additional density, the county does not specifically
permit incentive zoning.
V. DISCUSSION
A. New Urban Communities: Eliminating or Perpetuating Sprawl?
One of the major attractions of New Urban communities such as
those featured in Daybreak, Glenwood Park, and Vickery is that they
follow a timed, smart growth program that funnels growth into priority
growth districts or areas where existing infrastructure is in place to avoid
the nightmare of growth without planning and structure. However, it is
not entirely clear that the initiatives lumped together as “smart growth”
actually curb sprawl. While the academic and theoretical approach to
smart growth seems to indicate that sprawl can be overcome, this may
not be the case. For Daybreak, and South Jordan, Utah, the inclusion of a
New Urban community on the west side of town may help create more
livable communities. However, one major concern for Daybreak,
Glenwood Park, and Vickery should surround the availability of
affordable housing within the communities.

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. FORSYTH COUNTY, GA., ORDINANCE § 20A-3.3 (2006).
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B. Does Incentive Zoning Need to Be Changed to Accommodate123
Affordable Housing?
The incentive zoning concept adopted by West Jordan, Utah,
accommodates many amenities in the West Side Planning Area. The city,
however, neglects to include any bonus for the inclusion of affordable
housing within the 6,600 acres of the planning area. Commentators have
noted that “[d]emand for new housing has increased in recent years,
particularly within the suburban fringe around metropolitan areas.”124
This statement was made concerning growth in California over thirty
years ago.125 However, the statement is applicable126 in many states and

123. Compare incentive zoning where the incentive underlying the granting of density bonuses
is outlined in municipal code or ordinance, with the adoption of mandatory inclusionary zoning. See,
e.g., Brian Lerman, Mandatory Inclusionary Zoning—The Answer to the Affordable Housing
Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383, 391 (2006):
The major disadvantage of voluntary [inclusion] programs is that the incentives that have
to be granted to entice a developer can be detrimental to the municipality by burdening
the environment and local infrastructure. Incentives that merely offset the cost of the
affordable housing units may not be a sufficient inducement for developers. Another
disadvantage to voluntary programs is that developers are provided an element of choice:
if the ultimate market-rate buyer is willing to pay a premium that exceeds the public
incentives for affordable housing, the developer will forego the optional program. On the
other hand, mandatory programs require all developers to comply with the mandatory setaside of affordable units regardless of incentives, and thus provide more benefits to the
community than voluntary programs.
See also Julie M. Solinski, Affordable Housing Law in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut:
Lessons for Other States, 8-FALL J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 36, 66 (1998):
However, the combination of incentive zoning and other techniques will not provide the
powerful catalyst that a statute mandating that affordable housing be a priority would
produce. Certainly, some developers will be attracted to the density bonuses provided by
incentive zoning; nevertheless, without a mandate, most will seek to provide whatever
type of housing they can for profit, perhaps never giving affordable housing another
thought. . . . Without a statute on which to rely for support, why would developers litigate
an affordable housing application denial when they could just as easily build luxury
housing and make a larger profit?
But see Ann S. Mathews, Comment, Inclusionary Zoning in Westchester County, New York: Is it a
Viable Tool to Reduce a County-Wide Housing Crisis?, 27 PACE L. REV. 89, 113 (2006) (“[A]
generic inclusionary ordinance with mandatory set-aside provisions will not be sufficient to make a
marked difference in the availability of affordable housing. True success is contingent upon
providing flexibility to developers and options within the ordinance.”).
124. Gregory Mellon Fox & Barbara Rosenfeld Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low
and Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1015 (1976).
125. Though this study was conducted over thirty years ago, the principles discussed are still
relevant to the discussion of affordable housing.
126. See Seattle Planning Commission, Incentive Zoning, Feb. 2007, at 8, available at
http://www.seattle.gov/planningcommission/docs/SPC_IncZon.pdf (stating that “[b]ecause funds
gained from Incentive Zoning might be relatively small in some areas or zones with more

255]

INCENTIVE ZONING TO ELIMINATE SPRAWL

275

especially relevant in the Salt Lake Valley, Utah. These commentators
continue: “[t]he escalation in housing expense shows no sign of abating
and the trend could have broad social and economic consequences.”127
Furthermore, “[t]raditional solutions have failed to remedy the
problem.”128 In an attempt to remedy this solution, “housing density
bonuses”129 have emerged “as a means of encouraging the construction
of moderate-cost housing by private developers within the
community.”130 Housing density bonus programs are a subset or type of
bonus programs enacted, similar to typical amenity bonuses seen in the
West Jordan, Utah plan. However, “[a] housing development bonus
program has two main goals.”131 Primarily, the purpose of these
programs is to “help meet the critical needs of low- and moderateincome people by expanding the supply of moderately priced housing in
the community.”132 A separate purpose, and one more related to the
smart growth initiatives, is to “assure the dispersal of such housing
throughout the developing areas of the community,” without funneling
low and moderate income individuals into the more affordable declining
urban and suburban rings, or pushing them further out into sprawling
developments.133 Case studies examined the effectiveness of voluntary,
constrained height limits, these funds should not be spread over a wide variety of uses, but should be
focused on achieving a smaller, definable, list of goals.”). Of particular importance to Seattle was
trying to “[m]aximize harder to gain public improvements” rather than supplying public benefits that
are readily available through other land use tools. Id. The Seattle Planning Commission suggests
focusing incentive zoning on areas that have incentives “much less readily available,” such as
affordable housing initiatives. Id.
127. Fox, supra note 124, at 1015–16.
128. Id. at 1016.
129. “A housing density bonus program requires developers to provide a certain percentage of
newly contributed units at a price below the prevailing market price of the new units.” Id. at 1027.
The following illustrates how such a density bonus works:
[A] city may require that large residential developments will include twenty percent of
the total units as below market price . . . dwellings. In return, the developer may be
granted a twenty percent increase in the total number of units as a “bonus” to encourage
his participation in the program and perhaps to compensate his decreased revenues from
the [below market price] dwellings. The net effect is that the developer builds 120
percent of the units originally proposed and rents or sells 100 percent at the prevailing
market rate and 20 percent at a price below the market price. Because bonus units are
constructed on land already purchased for the original housing project, the streets,
sewers, water mains, driveways, and landscaping are already provided. The additional
units therefore add relatively few costs for site preparation, and the increased density
permitted on the site offsets the costs of constructing the [below market price] units.
Id.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 1016.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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encouraged, and mandated housing density bonuses with a range of
success.134 The results of several studies show that “[t]he voluntary
ordinances are not as successful in providing [below market price] units
as the mandatory programs.”135 Of particular concern was the reluctance
of developers to “cooperate with voluntary programs because of
uncertainty about the profitability of the density bonus.”136 Commenting
further, “[m]any [developers] do not understand how the bonus operates
to reduce land costs and to increase the amount of profit realized on the
investment.”137 Thus without mandatory provisions, oftentimes there was
a “breakdown in the negotiation process.”138 Thus as a conclusion, it has
been noted that
[p]rograms seeking only voluntary compliance with [below market
price] provisions and granting no density bonus to the developer appear
to yield the poorest results in low cost housing. Programs encouraging
voluntary compliance by granting a density bonus, however, seem to
generate some construction of necessary housing. Programs imposing
mandatory compliance with [below market price] requirements have
achieved the best results, particularly when combined with a density
bonus to allow the developer to recoup his expenses and to avoid
allegations of taking for public use without just compensation.139

When examined in relation to curbing urban sprawl and
implementing smart growth techniques, developments such as Daybreak,
Glenwood Park, and Vickery commonly fail inasmuch as they do not
adequately provide affordable housing. The use of incentive zoning can
be a powerful tool to bring needed amenities into communities, to
preserve open space, and to encourage healthy and greener living.
However, if not implemented correctly, incentive zoning may not
succeed in its desired attempt to funnel growth into priority growth
districts thereby curbing further sprawl. Without adequate affordable
housing opportunities, low- and moderate-income families are unable to
purchase homes in these New Urban communities and must either take
refuge in further suburban development, live in the inner urban and
declining suburban rings, or stay located in apartments in blighted
communities and areas where low-income housing can be found.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1036–67.
Id. at 1067.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1067–68.
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According to Gregory Mellon Fox and Barbara Rosenfeld Davis, the
appropriate remedy is granting developers mandatory density bonuses for
developing a percentage of below-market-price homes. Under the West
Side Planning Area and its incorporation of incentive zoning to
encourage added amenities, the City of West Jordan neglected to include
any density bonus relating to affordable housing. Such a situation can
and ought to be maintained, as it provides one of the most powerful
retardants against further sprawl. Growth will continue, and if
individuals cannot find growth in communities where they live, they will
travel further out or further in to find adequate housing.
1. Weaknesses and criticisms
One major criticism of New Urban communities is that they are
simply a “new style of sprawl rather than an alternative to sprawl.”140
This argument gains strength when combined with a glaring failure in
many New Urban communities to provide affordable housing. However,
the debate continues on whether requiring mandatory affordable housing
is worthwhile or even viable under economic principles.141 Even still,
when New Urban communities are developed in priority growth districts
it can lead to the gentrification of low-income individuals. If this is
indeed the case, then rather than preventing the further promulgation of
urban sprawl, developers of New Urban communities cast out lowincome individuals to either outlying fringes (where affordable housing
can be found) or else push these individuals into the first- and secondring declining suburban or even urban communities. Though
communities such as Daybreak, Glenwood Park, or Vickery include
town homes or condos for lower income individuals, the high housing
values in these communities may still prevent low-income individuals
from purchasing and surviving, let alone thriving. In fact, one study
indicated that average home prices in a New Urban community were
$30–40,000 higher142 than similar homes outside the community. This
increase in cost of living in a New Urban community can inadvertently
exclude many individuals from affording status. One commentator noted
that “[m]inority and poor communities in America have a long history of
140. Ohm & Sitkowski, supra note 76, at 857 (citing Peter Calthorpe, New Urbanism: A
Blueprint for Building a Better Neighborhood, DENVER POST, Apr. 26, 1998, at F-01).
141. See Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed: How Effective are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471 (2005). But see Laura
Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 539 (1995); Barbara Ehlrich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully
Creating Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971 (2002).
142. STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 106.
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not benefiting from urban planning initiatives and not being included in
the planning process.”143 Additionally, it was observed that “[d]ata
demonstrates that African-American housing consumption is greater in
sprawl communities, with Black households residing in larger units that
they are more likely to own, which increases their affordability.”144
Furthermore, this same commentator suggests that “New Urbanism may
generate a significant integrative effect on neighborhoods,”145 and “to the
extent that New Urbanism occurs in the central city, minority group
members that have resisted suburban migration might be more inclined
to move to an attractive New Urbanist neighborhood.”146 However, in
conclusion it is suggested that “neither leadership and resources nor
public opinion nor demand needed to increase spending for the essential
transportation infrastructure and to ease adoption of an integrated land
use plan exist.”147 Finally, that “[f]or [smart growth] to occur, financing
instruments and capital to fund the infill and redevelopment of the urban
center must be developed.”148
While commentators such as James Kushner suggest that smart
growth through New Urbanism is likely to be ineffective, many agree
that “if [New Urban developments are] designed around transit, [they]
could dramatically improve access to jobs and other services while
offering more diverse neighborhoods.”149 By designing New Urban
developments around transit and other infrastructure, individuals of all
income levels can live together in communities with access to jobs and
services necessary for individuals to survive and thrive without moving
to the suburban or ex-urban fringes.
James Kushner’s conclusion errs in the gaping exception at the end
of his analysis: “For [effective smart growth] to occur, financing
instruments and capital to fund the infill and redevelopment of the urban
center must be developed.”150 While it is acknowledged that James
Kushner is discussing New Urbanism from an urban standpoint, the point
is effective for suburban communities as well. Where smart growth
techniques such as priority growth districts are implemented, cities have
the ability to funnel growth to desirable areas and have the ability to
increase affordable housing. This financing tool derives from incentive
zoning. Through cities identifying the need for affordable housing in the
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Kushner, supra note 9, at 66.
Id.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id. at 72–73.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 73.
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community and providing a sufficient density bonus to developers to
complete economically viable projects, cities receive the financing and
capital necessary both to fund urban infill and redevelopment and to
funnel growth to priority growth districts in suburban communities,
thereby helping to alleviate sprawl.
2. Socio-economic barriers
The lack of affordable housing in New Urban communities may or
may not be an inadvertent exclusion for low-income individuals. With
the clustering of living quarters in these communities, families are forced
into sharing less space. Part of the disadvantage of sharing less space is
that communities are forced into closer interaction with each other,
interaction that may or may not be welcomed. One method which seems
to be used regardless of its constitutionality for dealing with this
potential problem is to erect an invisible gate around a gateless
community that shields residents from what they may consider to be the
“unwieldy” and “undesirable.” This figurative invisible gate is generally
erected by the prices charged for homes in a development, where
families with low or moderate income are unable to afford entry due to
the price of the homes. Even Daybreak could be said to contain an
invisible gate, as the starter priced condominiums in the development
range from the $170,000’s.151 During times of loosened lending
standards, people may qualify for entry into “invisibly gated”
communities and such an issue may not be as evident. However, as is
prevalent across the country since the sub-prime lending debacle, lenders
are tightening up on lending standards and making it more difficult for
families to qualify for loans once available, and the problems with the
invisible gate will likely become worse as families struggle to find
affordable housing. In the instance that families can find suitably priced
housing, many of the condominium units are situated at the very outskirt
of the New Urban community, providing a buffer between transit arteries
and the development hub of single family homes. Glenwood Park
features townhomes, condominiums, and single family homes.
Townhomes in Glenwood Park start in the mid-$400,000 range, though
they do provide a rooftop deck and green building techniques.152
Condominiums in the development are more reasonably priced with

151. Daybreak,
http://www.daybreakutah.com/search_results.php?builder=*&pricerange=
150000-174999&bedrooms=1-9&bathrooms=*&sqfootage=0-9999&stories=*&x=33&y=16
(last
visited Oct. 24, 2007).
152. Glenwood Park, http://www.glenwoodpark.com/core/item/page.aspx?s=6227.0.78.6078
(last visited Apr. 25, 2007).
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average prices from the $165,000 range to $295,000 for the first phase of
development.153 However, single family homes in Glenwood Park are
considerably more expensive with an average starting price just below
$500,000 and ratcheting up from there.154 The Vickery development,
located in a more rural community in Forsyth County, advertises itself as
a community with homes from the $300’s to the $1,000,000s.155
The goal of these communities was to provide a community where
all types of individuals could reside—with young families in single
family residences and seniors in either townhomes or condominiums.
The practical effect of many of these communities, however, is a barrier
on low-income individuals, as if these gateless communities were in fact
gated. According to The Urban Lawyer, the goal of New Urban
communities is that
“[w]ithin neighborhoods, a broad range of housing types and price
levels can bring people of diverse ages, races, and incomes into daily
interaction, strengthening the personal and civic bonds essential to an
authentic community.” Despite [the] theoretical emphasis on providing
a diverse housing stock, observers have criticized traditional
neighborhood developments and other New Urbanist-influenced
projects for not meeting a diversity of housing needs.156

Where individuals are encouraged to interact with the community in
a shared space environment, they may not object to segregating lowincome individuals from the community. However, if sprawl is to be
deterred, then municipalities will need to conjure up a remedy to the
invisible gate surrounding many of its pristine communities. If
municipalities harness the ability to use incentive zoning, many of these
disparities can be narrowed. One option would be for municipalities to
codify density bonuses for developers including a certain amount of units
at affordable pricing.157
In setting the appropriate amenity bonus, cities can elect to allot a
larger density bonus to developers willing to build a certain portion of
the development at affordable rates. While cities like West Jordan in its
153. Glenwood
Park,
http://www.glenwoodpark.com/net/content/page.aspx?
s=19741.0.78.6078 (last visited Apr. 25, 2007).
154. Glenwood Park, http://www.glenwoodpark.com/core/item/page.aspx?s=16807.0.78.6078
(last visited Apr. 25, 2007).
155. Vickery, http://www.vickeryvillage.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
156. Ohm & Sitkowski, supra note 76, at 857 (quoting CONGRESS FOR NEW URBANISM,
CHARTER
FOR
THE
NEW
URBANISM
2
(1993),,available
at
http://www.cnu.org/sites/files/charter_english.pdf).
157. Id.
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West Side Planning area often apportion the density bonus on an equal
footing with the cost of providing the amenity, the more appropriate
remedy may be to combine the approaches. First, establish the key core
amenities that the city desires using as a base point the availability of
other remedies and procedures to satisfy certain public concerns. Next,
factor in the appropriate cost for the developer in providing the specific
amenity. Finally, make adjustments to the density bonuses allotted
according to overall need in the community, rather than the cost to the
developer. If the city can create a high enough payoff for the developer,
the city can effectively guarantee that the developer will provide the
amenity. The payoff for the developer need not be so high that cities will
be described as “bargaining away the police power” or granting financial
windfalls for developers. The issue in many developments, including
Daybreak, Glenwood Park, and Vickery, is that the cities have failed to
establish concrete guidelines for developers to empower them to create
the necessary changes for affordable housing. If cities can address the
need for providing affordable housing then sprawl can be greatly
reduced.
C. Crisis Averted: Incentive Zoning Mechanisms as a Cure to Urban
Sprawl?
As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, Robert Freilich has
described seven major crises arising from urban sprawl. The use of
incentives may give municipalities a conduit for avoiding these crises.
1. Central city and first- and second-ring urban decline
Under incentive zoning and through the use of priority growth
districts, cities can target blighted areas where redevelopment is needed,
or through using steps similar to those outlined in Ramapo, cities can
adequately attract developers to help build in areas where adequate
infrastructure and services are found. The ability to correct central city
and first- and second-ring urban decline will come from the use of
appropriate incentives for developers and amenities to the city. As seen
in the West Side Planning Area proposed by the City of West Jordan,
Utah, city planners have the power to determine what amenities are
important for the city for both aesthetic and fiscal reasons. Attaching
appropriate density bonuses to these amenities can help provide
developers with the needed incentive to take on projects that would
otherwise be financially risky. Incentive zoning need not be the only
means of providing incentives for developers to help avoid urban and
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suburban ring decline. Determining the appropriate amount of density
bonus or incentive for developers will hinge on a number of factors.
However, these factors should include the cost to the developer while
also maintaining integrity to the overall level of preference for the
desired amenity or service in the community. In the West Side Planning
Area, for example, the density bonus for trails/open space was limited to
approximately 22%, which should reflect both proportionate cost to the
developer for providing the incentive but also limit the amount of trails
developers will provide. This is usually accomplished by putting a cap on
the total amount of bonuses that can be obtained by providing the entire
amenity the city desired. Furthermore, if the goal of cities is to help
prevent further urban and suburban ring decline, the use of incentive
zoning may need to be substantiated more in a code provision or other
form showing that the granting of the incentive is required upon the
providing of the amenity.
2. Environmental degradation through loss of wetlands and sensitive
lands and air and water quality degradation
The use of incentive zoning coupled with strong municipal help in
funneling growth into priority growth districts can minimize major
effects of environmental degradation. The primary means of
accomplishing this goal is through the use of New Urban development
which is particularly well suited to incentive zoning due to the clustering
of development with density bonuses and green space requirements. The
West Side Planning Area is an example of the types of incentives
municipalities can grant to accomplish the purpose of protecting the
environment. The West Side Planning Area purposefully takes into
consideration its effects on the environment through its designation of
density bonuses. The plan grants its largest density bonus for the
“[i]nstallation of enhanced open space/recreational amenities in excess of
that required per City standards.”158 This open space need not be limited
to installing a golf course throughout the community, but could be left as
forest, wetlands, or other specific area natural to the environment. In fact,
an ordinance governing the West Side Planning Area provides that
because there may be instances where a proposed project is incapable
of meeting one or several of the improvements and amenity criteria . . .
a developer may install substitute improvements; wherein the weighted
value of such an improvement or amenity shall be approved by the City

158. WEST JORDAN, UTAH, ORDINANCE § 89-3-1106(c) (2006).
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Council in their review of the Preliminary Development Plan.159

The result of these regulations is greater flexibility in creating and
granting incentives to developers. In order to further the preservation of
the environment, cities will need to make an effort to ensure that bonuses
are great enough to provide an incentive to developers to select this type
of improvement in their development. As with other forms of incentives,
cities may find greater success in implementing these plans if the
granting of bonuses is mandated by municipal code as opposed to being
voluntary and subject to the discretion of the city.
3. Energy over-utilization
One primary benefit of New Urban planning and New Urban
communities is providing walkable communities that provide
opportunities for individuals to escape the crutch of automobiles and to
enjoy energy-efficient and environmentally-efficient commutes. For
these benefits to accrue, the funneling mechanisms of priority growth
districts must be dovetailed with incentive zoning or another form of
incentive to developers. Transfer of Development Rights (TDR’s) may
also provide the needed incentive for developers, but TDR’s may not be
as popular amongst developers if they feel that the transfer of certain
rights and benefits in one location are not equal to the benefits received
in another. To encourage developers to build walkable, green, and
energy-efficient communities, incentive zoning can provide options to
developers in choosing where to develop. The benefit of a density bonus
in New Urban communities for the developer is that it may provide a
greater incentive to develop in an area than a simple TDR. Where TDR’s
may be prone to benefit the government, incentive zoning may be more
beneficial to developers, which can help promote the New Urban
communities, thereby perpetuating effective energy use. In general,
TDR’s are often more beneficial to the government because the rights
transferred by developers in order to develop may not be equal to the
rights the government receives, whereas incentive zoning generally
grants the developer added density at a lower cost of obtaining the
density—essentially purchasing the added density for a bargain.
The other facet of energy-efficient communities that helps eliminate
sprawl is the development centered on transit corridors. Suburban
families still need to leave the “community” to work and play, and
through greater access to these corridors—whether the interstate, bus, or

159. WEST JORDAN, UTAH, ORDINANCE § 89-3-1106(d) (2006); see also id. § 89-3-1106(f).
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other mass transit—individuals can cut down on energy utilization. For
example, the Glenwood Park development is nestled directly next to I-20
in Atlanta, Georgia and is also connected directly with Glenwood Ave.
and the Glenwood Memorial Connector, and access to the bus system,
MARTA, is directly off of Glenwood Ave.160 The Vickery community in
Forsyth County, Georgia also features effective energy utilization
through green construction techniques and proper placement near transit
corridors such as Georgia 400.161
Both of these communities pale in comparison to Kennecott Land’s
plans for the West Bench of Salt Lake County, Utah. Daybreak, with
over 4,100 acres already developed, is large enough to be an independent
city. The community has been developed using green-space initiatives
and plans for a major transit corridor in the center of the community.162
The community already sits on one transit corridor, Bangerter Highway,
and also plans for a light rail in the community.163
4. Fiscal insolvency and infrastructure and service deficiencies
The Ramapo case led the country into a time of smart growth
controls and ideas used to help prevent further problems with
communities unable to keep pace with continued growth. Perhaps the
biggest smart growth concept that can help prevent further urban sprawl
is the use of priority growth districts. The greatest benefit of these
districts is the ability of cities to adequately keep pace with growth and
sustain it in ways that do not cut back on the solvency of cities and allow
for the appropriate maintenance and use of existing infrastructure.
However, naming an area a priority growth district alone will not
accomplish the goal of channeling development to these regions that can
support it. Municipalities should look to incentive zoning among other
techniques which can, if appropriately enacted, leave developers with
confidence that these areas are prepared for development and that viable,
economically successful development will result. In order for this to
happen, cities may need to adopt amendments to local zoning ordinances
mandating density bonuses or other incentives for developers to
encourage their participation in developments within priority growth
districts.

160. Glenwood Park, http://glenwoodpark.com/net/content/item.aspx?s=27719.0.78.6078 (last
visited Apr. 25, 2007).
161. Vickery, http://www.vickeryvillage.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
162. Daybreak, http://www.daybreakutah.com/masterplan.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2007).
163. Id.
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5. Agricultural land loss
One of the biggest objectives of smart growth is the preservation of
environmental and agricultural land. As described by Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, “it is becoming increasingly apparent that American
government, both national and local, can no longer ignore what is
happening as the suburbs eat endlessly into the countryside.”164 The
purpose of priority growth districts, in addition to funneling development
to areas with infrastructure that can support growth, is to preserve
agricultural land. Though theoretically sound in the academic realm,
using priority growth districts to help preserve agricultural land will
hinge on a couple of events. First, the desire to put the land to its most
efficient and economical use will continue to grow so long as the need to
grow outward continues uninhibited. Additionally, individuals have a
general right under the Constitution to use their property as they see fit,
within the confines of the law. Therefore, to encourage preservation of
agricultural land, absent a slow in market forces that encourage
development, incentive zoning could be adopted. In order to provide a
mechanism that can help curb sprawl into agricultural communities,
cities would need to evaluate the importance of maintaining this land in
comparison to the value of other amenities or needs the community is
seeking. Requiring a mandatory incentive bonus in those parts of the
community located within a priority growth district would provide one
avenue for discouraging development on agricultural land. This can be
accomplished through developing brown-fields or other land not suitable
for agricultural use. Both Glenwood Park and Daybreak followed this
type of approach. If all the developable land in the community is
agricultural, another approach is granting greater density bonuses, or
bonuses that more quickly bring a developer to the maximum density for
a type of development through blocking off portions of the agricultural
land as open space. This would effectively serve two purposes. First, it
would preserve agricultural land, by “fencing off” land that was to be left
undeveloped, and second, it can help preserve the identity of the
community. A major focus of New Urban developments is to build
communities that are suitable to the identity of the community while also
incorporating effective and efficient building techniques. This can be
accomplished through this type of incentive.

164. Pollard, supra note 10, at 250 (quoting Moynihan, supra note 11).
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6. Diminished public health
The ability of incentive zoning to overcome diminishing public
health can be grouped into much of the same discussion as the previous
urban sprawl issues. However, the promotion of public health is one of
the more readily applicable benefits to New Urban communities.
Through the use of incentive zoning, cities can promote communities
that are pedestrian friendly, contain more public parks and facilities, and
encourage healthier lifestyles. The city of West Jordan, through the West
Side Planning Area, thought highly enough of pedestrian-friendly and
walkable communities that they designated these as required amenities
for developers developing in the community.165 Additionally, the
community required “[d]edication of open space, trail corridors or ‘in
lieu of fees’ in accordance with the Comprehensive General Plan and the
Parks, Recreation and Trails Master Plan.”166 Through the use of open
space, trails, walkable communities with minimum setback requirements,
the New Urban communities help reduce negative effects of sprawl by
encouraging residents to get out and walk around. By using incentive
zoning, municipalities can ensure that public health is given priority and
importance in communities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The effects of decades of sprawl have come full circle with many
communities and citizens. In an attempt to cut down on traffic and
congestion, to raise public health, to reunite neighbors with strong local
communities, and to save agricultural and wildlife land, priority growth
districts have been proposed in a number of states to combat the
continuing reach of sprawl. These districts help to protect outlying areas
by funneling development to areas—both suburban and ex-urban—that
are near transit corridors and can effectively increase density without
decreasing lifestyle for its citizens.
In an attempt to motivate developers to help solve the continuing
problem of sprawl, municipalities have implemented incentives for
developers who use smart growth strategies. Most of these incentives
take the form of density bonuses, allowing developers to increase the
number of units on a given parcel of land in exchange for the developer
giving up property or cash. Additional incentives include leniency in
height, floor area, and setback requirements.

165. WEST JORDAN, UTAH, ORDINANCE § 89-3-1106(c) (2006).
166. Id.
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While these forms of incentive zoning have proven helpful and have
overcome many issues relating to developer motivation in undertaking
New Urban community developments, they are not entirely sufficient,
and a number of other forms of incentive zoning should be entertained to
combat the criticisms of New Urban communities. One major effort in
future incentive zoning agreements should focus on providing more
affordable housing. This goal can be accomplished by city councils
providing an incentive bonus to developers for allotting a certain number
of units in the development as affordable housing. Additionally, through
a prioritization of amenities, cities can more effectively specify which
amenities are most desirable by providing higher density bonuses for the
inclusion of important amenities into the community.167 If cities can
adopt amendments requiring incentive zoning for certain amenities, such
as affordable housing, then sprawl, to a great extent, may be limited and
controlled. In certain developments such as Glenwood Park, where
twenty-eight acres are involved, the need for government to step in may
be limited by the accessibility of affordable homes in other areas in the
community. However, in situations involving considerably more land,
like Daybreak with nearly 4,200 acres and the West Side Planning Area
with over 6,600 acres, then a very well-crafted and hands-on approach
must be taken by cities to ensure there is adequate affordable housing,
and incentive zoning is a key to succeeding. Without the effective use of
zoning techniques such as incentive zoning, cities merely end up with a
“new style of sprawl rather than an alternative to sprawl.”168
J. Spencer Clark∗

167. Seattle Planning Commission, supra note 126, at 8.
168. Ohm & Sitkowski, supra note 76, at 857 (quoting Peter Calthorpe, New Urbanism: A
Blueprint for Building a Better Neighborhood, DENVER POST, Apr. 26, 1998, at F-01).
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